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Abstract 
 
This study examines a reforestation program, TIST (The International Small Group and Tree Planting 
Program), and its effects on farmer's tree planting behavior. TIST is funded by selling carbon credits on 
the Voluntary Carbon Market and derive the carbon credits from farmers who plant trees in their own 
lands. In return TIST provides them with education on tree planting, free seedlings, a portion of the 
sales and organize farmers into small groups for enabling knowledge exchange. The study looks at 
what factors influenced the farmers into planting trees and what role the TIST program played in this 
decision. The main finding is that among the TIST benefits free seedlings, carbon payments and 
assistance in watering were determining factors. Other influential Non-TIST factors were increased 
labor costs and decreased rainfall, which affected agricultural profitability. 
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1. Introduction 
Few scientist today dispute that climate change is most likely caused by man and will have detrimental 
impacts on human society. Increased frequency of extreme weather with storms, drought, the spread of 
disease to temporal regions and a higher ocean level will all become our future reality. A leading cause 
of climate change today is the changes in land-use patterns where forests are converted for agricultural 
use or removed to make way for urban- and infrastructional expansion. 17% of anthropological 
greenhouse gas emissions are caused by deforestation (Stern, 2006) and between 2000-2005 12.9 
million hectares was deforested (IPCC, 2007). But, the net loss of forest cover was only 7,3 million 
hectares because of forest regrowth. Deforestation was most severe in South America, Africa and Asia 
but was partly compensated through added tree cover in the rest of the world. The potential of carbon 
sequestration through afforestation and reforestation (A/R) has been estimated to 1GtCo2/year, 
8GtCo2/year being the current net emissions (Stern, 2006).  
 
Mitigation through forest activities has been shown to be highly cost-effective and also generates other 
benefits in the form of fuel wood and timber (Thomas, 2010). Although preventing deforestation is a 
more cost-effective approach for mitigating carbon emissions, tree planting is also a relatively cost-
effective method (Sedjo et al, 1995). Although forest regrowth today is mainly taking place in the 
temporal zone the possibilities to sequester large quantities of carbon are greater in the tropics due to 
faster growth rates, available land and demand for biomass (Schlamadinger et al, 2007). 
 
The cost of capturing the carbon dioxide has been estimated to be between 5-15 dollars/tC globally 
(Benitez, 2005). This is in line with the results in a study on carbon mitigation in India estimating a 
cost of 3,3-7,3 $/tC (Ravindranath et al, 1995). The same study estimated the Indian mitigation 
potential through A/R-activities to be between 23-175*10^6 Mg C. Hooda (2007) points to the fact that 
suitable land for A/R projects in India is not hard to find and consists of degraded lands, under stocked 
forests and farmland, pointing to the possibilities of Indian land to work as a carbon sink.  
 
Funding of A/R-programs has historically been a task for national governments and government 
agencies. Now alternative sources of funding are emerging in the form of actors seeking to carbon 
compensate their carbon dioxide emissions. In newly established markets, such as the voluntary carbon 
markets and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), nations, companies and even individuals can 
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transact carbon credits. This additional inflow of capital makes way for new actors to enter the field of 
reforestation. As of 2011, 24% of the carbon credits bought and sold on the voluntary carbon markets 
were forest related project of which 10% were A/R projects. The CDM market has been slow to fund 
forest programs due to a long registration process and high transaction costs but nonetheless had 36 
registered projects as of 2011 (Peters-Stanley et. Al, 2012; Thomas, 2010). As these new forms of 
investment appear, the question arises of how to manage them in the most cost-effective manner so as 
to create maximal carbon dioxide reductions and thereby generate sellable carbon credits. Privately 
funded A/R projects have small possibilities to change government policies, secure land tenure and 
provide better access to markets and must instead focus on other incentives to encourage tree planting. 
One of these programs is “The international small group and tree planting program” (TIST) and is the 
case studied in this thesis. On a small budget they encourage small scale farmers in Tamil Nadu, India, 
to plant trees on their land by providing multiple benefits and incentives for engaging in tree planting.  
 
The focus of much of earlier research on the determinants of tree planting behavior of farmers in 
developing countries has to a large extent been to identify the household- characteristics and farm 
characteristics of tree planting farmers - i.e. age and gender composition, on and off-farm income, farm 
size, farm tenure, attitudes towards risk (see: Mekonnen, 2011; Mekonnen, 2009; Alavalapati, 1995; 
Patel, 1995; Dewees, 1991) and so on. Research on farmers tree planting in situations with assisting 
forest programs follow the same focus and have tried to find what distinguish farmers who choose to 
participate in the program from those who do not (see: Thacher, 1997). By finding evidence for what 
characterize the farmers who join these programs future programs can be more effective by targeting 
the most receptible households. On the other hand, less research has looked at what particular 
incentives encourage farmers to adopt tree planting (Enters, 2004) and existing studies most often look 
at large scale government programs (see: Lamb, 2011; Nawir, 2007; Murray and Bannister, 2004, 
Nibbering, 1999). With a growing number of smaller reforestation programs funded through the carbon 
credits markets there is a need to look at how they, with their limited means, can encourage smallholder 
tree planting activities.  
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1.1 Aim of the study 
 
The study aims to identify what parts of small-scale tree planting programs that have had a significant 
effect on smallholders' decision to plant trees. It also examines the contextual economic push-factors 
influencing this decision.  
 
 
Research questions 
In order to fulfil the aim stated above, the following research questions will be answered through this 
study: 
  
 What factors made the farmers engage in planting trees? 
 Which factors in the TIST program played a determining role? 
 What characterize a farmer dependent on the TIST program to plant trees? 
 
1.2 Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis is outlined in the following way. Chapter 2 presents two theoretical models chosen due to 
their ability to predict the impact on the household decision to plant trees of the different benefits 
provided by TIST. Chapter 3 builds on the variables identified in the models and reviews earlier 
empirical evidence of their effect on tree planting. In chapter 4 the choice of research design and the 
method of data collection are presented and motivated. In chapter 5 the results on farmer perception of 
determining factors and observations on important farmer characteristics are reported. Chapter 6 
contains the analysis and conclusions.  
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2. Theoretical Framework 
 
In this section two models on tree planting adoption behavior will be examined. The selection of 
models was made based on the criteria of including the variables exemplified by the TIST organization. 
As mentioned previously, TIST provides multiple benefits intended to attract farmers to start planting 
trees. These include: providing free seedlings, annual carbon payments based on number of trees 
planted, technical assistance in the planting phase, organizing the farmers into small groups to enable 
exchange of knowledge and arrange large group meetings where tree growing related information is 
conveyed. The models were chosen based on their ability to predict how the provisioning of these 
incentives could affect the relative attractiveness of tree planting. In addition, the external push-factors 
identified by the farmers, increased labor costs and reduced rainfall are included in the framework.  
 
2.1 Theoretical models 
 
The decision to plant trees is determined by a myriad of factors (Fig 1). Among these, TIST provides 
only a fraction of the possible incentives. This limited set of influential factors will be the focus in the 
following models.  
2.1.1 Model 1 
 
Amacher et al. (1993) were among the first to model agroforestry adoption with the combination of 
expected utility theory and the household production framework under uncertainty. They construct a 
model to predict determinants of a household's willingness to adopt a new forest technology. A 
household is faced with two problems to maximize utility. Firstly they have a classical utility function 
where they need to chose an optimal bundle of goods to maximize utility from consumption. Secondly 
they need to optimize the use of inputs in farm production.  
 
V(p , I ; C) = max EU (Yf , Yo ; C),   (1) 
 
where Yf is the consumption of forest-produced goods and Yo is the consumption of other goods.  
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s.t.   -  sum (pj*Yj) + M + π  = 0, (2)    
 
where π  is the return from forest activities, M other income, pj prices and Yj total consumption. 
 
π  in turn is explained by the following function:   
 
π  = pf*Qf – rL,     (3) 
 
Illustration 1: Tree planting determinants    Source: Predo, 
2003
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where Qf is forest production, r is cost of tree planting and L is a proxy for the combined use of land, 
capital and labor in tree production. Meaning returns of forest activities equals earnings minus costs. As 
we can see the budget constraint (2) is dependent on the income from forest products which in turn is 
dependent on Qf, the production of forest products.  
 
The household production function is: 
 
Qf = f (µ,L) = f ( µ * L)     (4) 
 
in which a higher L yields a higher Qf and µ is a random component. 
 
The model is simplified by holding Yo constant and assuming that the household consumes it's own 
produce of forest products, Qf = Yf. The household's decision is  
 
 maxL E[U(I*)] , 
 
I* being the household budget. By using the implicit function theorem they differentiate the L over I*, 
thereby finding which how the investments in L will change as income, or the components of income, 
change.  
 
They find that increases in income, regardless of source, and endowments in capital, labor and land will 
increase the household's willingness to invest in trees, the explanation being that these increases will 
make the household more flexible in its production and consumption decisions and that risk averseness 
decreases with higher income. Following this, factors increasing the quality of labor will increase the 
likelihood of planting trees as this increases the factor endowment, meaning land, labor and capital can 
be utilized better. This includes education, information and technical assistance.  
 
2.1.2 Model 2 
 
Shively (1998) compared the decision of how big share of agricultural land to divert to forest plantation 
to a portfolio choice problem and an investment problem under uncertainty. It is assumed that the 
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investment can be made only once and at any time. The investment-choice is also assumed to be 
irreversible and that the investment cost is non-recoverable. The choice is hence how much land to 
divert to tree planting to optimize 
 
Max E {∑ßtU(πt)}   (5) 
 
Subject to the definition of income, 
 
πt = θ pt(tree) g(t) + (1- θ)pt (food)y – θI         (6) 
 
where θ is the share of land devoted to tree plantations, ß is a discount factor, πt is net income at time t, 
p is the price of noted crop, g(t) is growth in forest output over time, y is the yield in food crop, and I is 
the investment cost of investing in trees. In the investment cost include the opportunity cost of the land 
devoted to tree planting is included, meaning the lost income from food crops on the same piece of 
land.  
 
The first year utility is constrained by: 
 
πt = θ pt(tree) g(t) + (1- θ)pt (food)y  -  θI         (7) 
 
and every year that follows: 
 
 πt = θ pt(tree) g(t) + (1- θ)pt (food)y             (8),  
 
where cost of investment is no longer included. 
 
The optimality condition of the model is: 
 
u' (πt) =  ßEt {u'(πt+1) [pt+1(tree) g(t) – pt+1(food)y - I]}      (7) 
 
which shows that the farmer will chose land shares so that the expected marginal values for each crop 
is equal. The expression shows that the willingness of the farmer to invest in trees is affected by the 
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investment cost, expected prices of food and tree crops as well as the relative risk of planting trees and 
the importance of risk to the farmer.  
2.2 Summary of expected determinants 
 
Any addition to income or available labor, land or capital will increase the willingness to plant trees 
according to model 1. Any external influence increasing these endowments are likely to increase the 
likelihood of tree planting, education being one of these factors as the educated can made better use of 
his or her available productive factors. A reduction in investment costs according to model 2 will reduce 
the investment barrier, making it easier to plant. Shively (1998) includes in his definition of investment 
cost the opportunity cost of the land occupied by the young trees. Thus a decrease in returns from the 
best alternative land use will spur a transit to silviculture. For future reference, free seedlings and the 
carbon payments will be defined as a decrease in investment cost and increased labor costs and reduced 
rainfall as reductions in opportunity cost of tree planting.  
 
The rest of this thesis will be structured around these categories, which are organized in the following 
way: 
 
Increase in productive factor endowments 
 Education and technical assistance (Provided by TIST) 
Reduction in investment costs 
 Free seedlings (Provided by TIST) 
 Cash incentives (Provided by TIST) 
 Reduced alternative cost to tree planting 
▪ Increased labor costs (External) 
▪ Reduced rainfall (External) 
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3. Empirical Evidence 
 
This section contains a review of existing empirical evidence. The review will be structured following 
the above organization of identified influential factors. The evidence of the effect of education is 
followed by the reduction in investment costs, which include free seedlings and cash incentives, and 
reduced opportunity costs.  
3.1 Increments in productive factors endowments through education 
 
Not having the right knowledge can be a barrier for any endeavor, and so including tree planting. Being 
comfortable with a new type of farming method can decrease the perceived risks and uncertainties 
(Pattanayak, 2002). In a meta study on quantitative studies by Pattanayak et al. (2002) all studies 
examining "received training" and "extension services" were significant and had a positive impact on 
adopting tree planting in an agro forestry setting. Predo (2003) found similar results in the Philippines 
where farmers who were more familiar with the economic and ecological consequences of planting 
trees were more likely to engage in such land use.  
 
In case studies on programs providing education to participating members these factors have been 
shown to be fairly effective. Baynes (2007, in Lamb 2011 p. 412) looked at a government program in 
the Philippines that tried to encourage farmers to adopt silviculture by providing education in the form 
of field trips to successful plantations where they could interact with the farmers. Most participant 
chose to plant trees after this and also knowing they would receive additional help in setting up 
nurseries, pruning and free seedlings. The farmers were self-selected and most had unused land on their 
farms, which presumably would make them more interested in a low intensive land use. Other schools 
of thought have looked at the effect of education as well, for example the Theory of Planned Behavior 
framework (Williams, 2012). The results show that education increases the knowledge of how to plant 
trees as well as the farmer's perception of his or hers ability to successfully implement a tree plantation. 
These two factors in turn are shown to be important predictors of adoption.  
 
3.2 Reduction in investment cost 
 
A reduction in investment costs has two main sources, physical and financial assistance and the reduced 
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opportunities in making a living from alternative land uses.  
3.2.1 Seedlings and cash incentives 
 
It is no easy thing assessing the effect of monetary or physical incentives, such as seedlings, as they are 
difficult to separate from the institutional setting or market incentives. Schemes including these 
benefits have produced different results in different settings and Enters (2004) concludes that their 
effect is inferior to "enabling incentives" such as access to infrastructure, tenure security and access to 
credit. In a non-favorable environment with low prices and high risk their effect will be small but, if 
provided in a favorable setting, their marginal effect will be much bigger.  
 
Planting programs often bundle a lot of factors meant to encourage tree planting in their programs, and 
seedling and cash payments are often provided simultaneously. This makes it impossible to disentangle 
their separate effects but cumulatively the results points toward confirming the above conclusion of 
Enters (2004). Nawir (2007) finds that if favorable conditions can be established where the farmers 
more easily can access markets and transaction costs are reduced, providing free seedlings can have 
some effect. Nibbering (1999) observes a triggering effect of free seedlings in combination with cash 
incentives in Indonesia where favorable conditions in the form of better access to market and reduced 
returns from agriculture were becoming more apparent. Cash incentives can be a way to encourage 
both unsure farmers to adopt a new technology (Lamb, 2011) and those unwilling to pay for what they 
usually gather in natural forests for free (Godoy, 1992). Lamb (2011) on the other hand observes a risk 
of encouraging economically non-viable tree plantations. The targeting should be made with care and 
focus on the more poor households who might be facing an actual capital constraint. It might also be 
that farmers only plant the trees for the short term cash and don't maintain the trees for the long-term 
benefits (Dewees and Arnold, 1999).  
 
In programs including free seedling, and no cash payments, some influence on the willingness to plant 
trees is found. That seedlings can facilitate the initiation of planting trees is showed by Salam (2010) 
who finds a significant and positive effect of awareness of a government program providing free 
seedlings and extension services. The farmers were unable to afford the investment cost and reported 
that access to good seedlings were one of the inhibiting factors to initiate tree planting, which 
strengthens the argument that the provisioning of seedlings were effective. Also in India subsidized 
seedlings proved to have an effect on the willingness to plant trees (World Bank, 1994). The most 
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aggressive arguments for the effect of free seedlings is offered by Bannister and Murray (2004) 
regarding a nationwide tree planting program on Haiti. They claim that if seedlings had been sold at 
market price essentially no one would initiate tree planting, and even at a subsidized price of 10 % the 
market price barely 1/200th of the participating farmers would have joined they estimate. But, just like 
the combination of grants and seedlings, the large effect of the free seedlings is enhanced by beneficial 
circumstances with market accessibility, secure tenure and increasing wood scarcity combined with a 
growing market demand.  
 
Some are less certain of the effects of providing free seedlings. According to Deewes and Arnold 
(1998) and Lamb (2011), planting trees is no big investment and the costs should not be a big hindrance 
to plant. Supplying seedlings might instead hamper the establishment of commercial nurseries creating 
dependence on outside assistance. They advise against free seedlings as a fiscal aid and urge it only be 
used when seedlings are hard to raise or difficult to acquire. 
 
3.2.3. Reduced opportunity costs 
 
When the potential income from agriculture decreases, tree planting can become the most rational land 
use. Reasons for a reduction in agricultural income are changes in available labor, increased cost of 
labor and other inputs, and diminishing yields.  
 
3.2.3.1. The Cost of Labor 
 
It is commonly agreed that planting trees is less labor intensive compared to agricultural land use. As a 
consequence a household with access to less labor is expected be more prone to adopt tree planting 
since it will not be able to utilize the land optimally with agriculture (Deewes, 1991; Thacher, 1997). 
The decision to plant trees then becomes the next best way to make use of the land when the household 
lacks the resources to use it more intensively (Dewees, 1991; Malla, 1999).  
 
The reasons farmers do not have enough available labor for intensive agriculture have multiple 
explanations. Dewees (1991) find that older households are more prone to adopt tree planting as their 
children often have moved away and they are themselves unable to do much physical work. The loss of 
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household labor can also be explained by the increasing opportunities of off-farm employment. It either 
drains farm labor until agriculture is no longer viable or the farmer will himself plant trees to make 
more time for some alternative off-farm income (Thacher, 1997; Dewees, 1991; Yam Malla, 1999; 
Arnold, 1990, Arnold and Falconer, 1989; Dewees and Saxena, 1995 in Arnold and Dewees 1999).  
 
On the other hand, Patel (1995) finds that access to labor makes tree planting more likely, which might 
be explained by larger families having a bigger fuel wood demand and therefore grow more trees. 
Scherr (1995) also finds that access to water and labor are what constrains farmers from adopting 
agroforestry technologies.  
 
Tree growing being less intensive than agriculture also makes it more likely to be adopted when 
agricultural wages increase, making agriculture more expensive to run (Patel, 1995). This effect has 
been observed in several Asia-Pacific countries where increased wages spurred private tree adoption 
rates (Enters, 2004). As the wages rise, planting trees is then chosen as the next best alternative (Arnold 
1990; Arnold and Falconer, 1989). Depending on tree species and agricultural crop the need for 
fertilizers and pesticides might be reduced when turning to silviculture meaning increased costs in these 
commodities will have the same effects as increased labor costs (Arnold and Falconer, 1989). 
 
3.2.3.2 Rainfall 
 
Although the empirical evidence is sparse, some findings indicate that trees are preferred to agriculture 
in areas with lower rainfall, as they are more drought resistant. Their roots go deeper and are thus not 
as dependent on regular rainfall as agricultural food crops which make them a way for the farmers to 
ensure some income in times of drought (Arnold and Falconer, 1989).  
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4. Method 
 
To understand how a small scale tree planting program can affect farmers’ decision to plant trees a case 
study was done on the TIST-organizations and work in Tamil Nadu, India. The purpose of the data 
collection was to map the existing reasons among the TIST -members for choosing to plant trees. When 
attempting to comprehend the entire width of a situation a qualitative method is suitable and was used 
in this case study. The study is thus not intended to quantify the influential power of each incentive to 
plant but instead to describe the multitude of factors influencing the household decision to plant trees. 
The study also aims to examine which of the TIST factors that played a determining role in the farmer's 
decision to plant trees. As the ability of TIST to encourage the farmers to plant trees is not studied, and 
remains unproven, the thesis rests on the assumption that TIST have a marginal effect on the tree 
planting decision which will be discussed further below. 
 
The experiences of the farmers are key to understanding their decision-making. A method focused on 
capturing the subjective experiences of the farmer was therefore chosen. In-depth, semi-structured 
interviews were used to collect the data. It enabled follow-up questions and provided the flexibility 
needed to understand each unique situation. It also gave room for unpredictable factors so surface. This 
ensured that the complexity behind the farmer's choice to plant trees could be discerned, and the 
determining factors identified. As the economical and physical conditions for the farmers varied 
greatly, and the incentives offered by TIST varied across villages, an open interview setting was even 
more suitable.  
 
 
4.1 Case description 
 
The case chosen is a tree planting program run by the International small group and tree planting 
program (TIST) that encourages small-scale farmers to plant trees on their own lands. The carbon 
dioxide sequestered by the trees is then sold internationally as carbon credits on the voluntary carbon 
market. The credit sales are administered by a for-profit organization called Clean Air Action 
Cooperation (CAAC) who also funds the TIST program. 70% of the sales are returned on a quarterly or 
yearly basis to the farmer as carbon payments and 30% are used to run the program and as returns on 
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investment for CAAC. The farmer remains the owner of the trees and all revenue it generates, but 
grants TIST the rights of the carbon credits. According to TIST official documents, aside from the 
direct payments the program is said to offer a multitude of benefits to the farmer that can be supposed 
to make planting trees a more attractive choice. The farmers are organized into groups of 6-12 people 
to strengthen their organizational capacity and to create a platform where information can be shared. 
TIST also educate the farmers on how to set up a plantation cheaply and provide them with seedlings 
for free or at reduced costs. They also inform them on matters such as health and the ecological 
benefits of woodlots.  
 
The TIST program has thus far been able to attract 1400 farmers to offset all or a part of their land for 
tree plantations. The benefits offered by TIST can therefore be expected to have created some 
additional tree plantations compared to a case without them. Under this assumption it is of interest to 
further understand which parts of the TIST-program actually have an influential effect on tree planting 
behavior. 
 
4.2 Interviews 
 
The collection of data was done through individual semi-structured in-depth interviews with the TIST-
members. The farmers are the actors of interest as they make the land-use decision on their farms. The 
nature of the questions was open-ended to capture unpredicted answers that might be lost in a survey 
questionnaire. The purpose of the interviews was hence partly explorative as they were looking for 
previously unknown information. 
 
Most variables are examined following a similar pattern. Firstly the respondent was asked to recall the 
time where they were introduced to TIST and if they have been aware they would receive the particular 
benefit by joining TIST. Secondly, the respondent was asked whether or not they would have joined 
TIST had this factor not been provided. For a variable to be considered crucial, the farmers had to state 
that they would not have joined the program had this benefit not been provided. 
 
Toward the end of the interview the respondent was asked to rank the factors felt to have influenced his 
or her decision. In this way contradictions could be identified and the respondent was helped to 
structure his or her views.  
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To further understand the situation of the farmers in Tamil Nadu and their choice for planting trees an 
executive of the Tamil Nadu forest department and an assistant in a government reforestation program 
were interviewed.  
 
As the farmers were dependent on TIST for the carbon payments and group meetings there was a risk 
that they would not be completely honest if they suspected their answers might affect their payments. 
For this reason all farmers were promised anonymity prior to each interview and it was explicitly stated 
that neither TIST nor anyone else would be able to trace their answers back to them. No farmer seemed 
reluctant to answer any questions truthfully due to fear they might lose TIST benefits. Instead it was 
often expressed that they would answer our question with or without being anonymous. In light of this 
it is deemed unlikely that the answers were influenced by any fear of repercussions from TIST. 
 
Methodological issues 
Using recalled data where the farmer remembers whether or not he or she would have joined the 
program with or without certain factors is highly problematic. Efforts were made for the farmers to 
properly recall the decision he or she was facing as TIST introduced themselves and what he or she was 
expecting to get from the program.  It is still likely that the answers were influenced by the actual 
outcome of the TIST benefits. For example, the farmer might have expected the group meetings to be 
very beneficial but if they turned out not to be this could affect the recollection of the actual 
expectation that made the farmer join. An argument against this is that the stated influential power of 
the small groups did not differ between farmers in current non-functioning groups and functioning 
groups. The function of the group also turned out to be where the promise from TIST and the actual 
outcome differed the most, further strengthening the argument. Still, there is a potential risk the actual 
outcome affected the answers given. 
4.3 The choice of interviewees 
 
To ensure a diverse sample with maximal variation, interviewees were selected from seven villages in 
five geographical areas, which meant they had been contacted by four different TIST personnel. The 
interviewees varied in age, land size, and position within the village. The income distribution within the 
sample was also fairly large. Mostly men were interviewed as they were the household decision-
makers, but in a few cases the woman of the household had made the decision to plant trees and was 
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thus interviewed.  
 
The interviewees are divided into two groups based on the timing of their tree planting and 
involvement with TIST. The first group started planting after meeting the TIST staff, thus as a 
consequence of meeting them. The other group had already converted all or some of their land to tree 
plantations before meeting TIST.   
 
For both groups interviews were made until no further aspects were revealed and theoretical saturation 
was assumed to be reached. In total 20 interviews were made of which 19 are complete. The sample is 
non-random and the data is not intended to be quantified within the groups.   
 
4.4 Working with an interpreter 
 
All interviewees spoke Tamil as their first language and I used an Tamil-English interpreter in the 
interviews. In one case the interviewee spoke English and so the interview was carried out in English. 
The interpreter was well instructed on the purpose of the study and the interview material so as to 
minimize the risk of misunderstandings. Using an interpreter always causes extra inaccuracy as the 
quality of the translation is hard to determine.  
 
The interviews were recorded and a transcript made. All interviews were listened to at least twice and 
when in doubt of exact wording a second party did a double check to increase reliability. 
 
4.5 Operationalizations 
 
The external influential factors identified in chapter 2 will be operationalized. The operationalizations 
are very direct as a follows when the theoretical concepts are concrete.  
The categories are sub-divided into the variables actually measured. 
4.5.1 Reduced cost of investment 
 
As could be seen from the description of the case, there are two benefits provided by TIST that could 
influence the cost of investment for the farmer. These are free seedling and carbon payments. As briefly 
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touched upon in section 2 the third factor able affect the cost of investment is the opportunity cost of 
land. 
 
Free seedlings were operationalized by following the above mentioned procedure of recalling if they 
knew this would be a benefit of joining, and if they would have joined without it.   
 
Operationalizing the Carbon payment was done in the same fashion.  
 
Changes in opportunity cost of land was measured by asking questions of what the land would have 
been used for had the respondent not planted trees and what approximate income that would have 
generated. This was done by asking if the profitability in the alternative had changed during the years 
prior to the land use-change and what factors had contributed to it.  
 
4.5.2 Improved use of productive factors 
 
The theoretical concept of the improvement of productive factors is measured by improvement in 
education and tree planting knowledge. Questions were asked regarding expected technical assistance 
from TIST and expected benefits from group meetings.  
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5. Results 
 
In total 20 interviews were made, of which 19 were complete and used in the study. Nine farmers report 
they would not have planted trees in a case without TIST and ten farmers either would have planted 
anyways or had already planted before being introduced to the program. At the end of this section a 
comparison between these groups will be made. The rest is dedicated to presenting whether or not the 
TIST benefits were thought of as necessities for planting trees and expressed external determining 
factors. For clarification, when TIST incentives are the determining reason only results from the group 
who would not have planted without TIST are presented. For non-TIST reasons the results from all 
nineteen interviews are presented.  
 
5.1 Increments in productive factor endowments through education 
 
As described in the Case Description education on how to care for their tree plantation was provided 
by TIST in two ways. Firstly through technical advice on how to plant the trees and how to maintain 
them as they matured, and secondly through group meetings. Due to different working methods of the 
TIST staff sometimes the farmer did not know they would receive any help until after they joined and 
was about to initiate the plantation. Farmers who were aware of the technical assistance "were 
expecting some information to get about how to plant and what kind of things of use in the field", but 
none found it to be a determining factor and would have joined without it. They either knew how to 
plant already or they "would still do it, but in their own convenient way". The same was true for the 
expectations on the group meetings, they either could see no benefits from them or didn't find them 
attractive enough. The general knowledge of how the groups would work was low.  
 
5.2 Reduction in investment cost 
 
The factors causing a decrease in investment costs comes in two forms, financial and physical aid from 
TIST or external factors causing reduced income in agriculture. 
5.2.1 Free seedlings from TIST 
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Free seedlings was one factor that some farmers would not have planted without. It either tipped the 
scale for the farmer to initiate a tree plantation on its own or it worked in combination with for example 
carbon payments. In all examined villages TIST handled out free teak seedlings in quantities ranging 
from 50 to 4000. The perceived price of seedlings in the market varied greatly between the villages, 
from 2 to 50 rupees and so the total expense saved ranged from 2100 to 36 000 rupees. This cost was 
too much for the farmers to bear on their own.  
 
All farmers had access to seedlings in the market but many were most often limited by their budgets to 
buy them. They "couldn't afford the initial seedling cost" and therefore "if they need to buy outside they 
won't do it [plant trees]". The free seedlings either significantly added to an already planned number of 
trees or made planting possible altogether. This was because the farmers would only have been able to 
afford just "a few trees on their own". A farmer with five acres of land "could afford around 50, and just 
planted" in a case with no free seedlings instead of 2500 which later became the actual case. So without 
the free seedlings no viable land use consisting of tree plantation existed. In one special case one 
farmer "felt he didn't need them that much" but since they were given for free he thought he might as 
well take them as he had some spare land.  
   
5.2.2 Received Carbon Payments from TIST 
 
Based on standing trees the farmers are given a set amount of money per tree on a yearly, six-month or 
quarterly basis. The amount varies slightly between farmers in the interval of 1.5-2.0 rupees per tree 
and year. It was given as a necessary incentive to plant the trees. The carbon money provided an extra 
income and security for the farmer as the money is used to replace lost seedlings in the initial stage of 
the plantation (at this point the seedlings are more susceptible to drought). Two reasons were 
mentioned for why the carbon payments was a necessary factor. First, it is used "to preserve the plants 
the first years on their life when they're vulnerable so "if some plants are lost, I can afford to replace 
them". Secondly the payments are attractive only as additional short-term income and fill no particular 
purpose. Getting income in the present can even provide more of an incentive to plant the trees than the 
actual income from the trees as "the carbon money he is going to get right now, once in every three 
months. But the fruits and the teak it is going to be in the future".  
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5.2.3 Reduced Opportunity Costs 
 
Not being able to make a living from agriculture was a major reason for choosing to plant trees. Three 
factors were mentioned that reduced income from agriculture or made it impossible to run altogether: 
increasing labor costs, difficulty to find labor and reduced rainfall.  
 
5.2.3.1. The Cost of Labor 
 
The most common crops grown prior or parallel with the tree plantation was rice paddy, sugar cane and 
peanuts. They were all said to be more labor intensive as "on the plantation he only need 25 % of the 
labor he would need in agriculture" and "you plant only once" and then the trees are fairly low 
maintenance. When the farmers met higher agricultural wages it affected the agricultural profitability 
severely. The farmers reported large increases in labor wages - by up to 600% over the past few years - 
"the cost of [a days] work has increased from previously 20 rupees, and right now for one person 120 
rupees". At the time of ”doing some agriculture labor was very cheap [...] but right now I am not [doing 
agriculture]." The increased wages strained the budget until they "could get no profit in agriculture 
because labor and fertilizer cost has increased". The government was blamed for the increased wages 
when they introduced a welfare program - the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act (N.R.E.G.A) - which provides 100 days of government employment per year (Zimmerman, 2012). 
"...agriculture is losing because of the government. Because if the people, a normal person, a laborer he 
is going to get 100 rupees per day for not doing any work so of course he's going to work for the 
government. They're saying they just sleep on their job, and they just sleep and [the employers] give 
them money, why do they need to do work in the field?"  
 
4.5.3.2 Difficult to find labor 
When doing agriculture the need for labor varies drastically over the season and is concentrated during 
planting and harvesting. In sugarcane production the timing of these events are very crucial and the 
farmer need "labor at the right time". But as farmers "can't find labor" for these sensitive periods they 
become unable to properly grow sugarcane. Planting trees is then seen as a better option since the need 
for labor is less and not as time dependent.  
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4.2.3.3. Reduction in rainfall 
 
Some farmers have experiences a reduction in rainfall over the course of their lifetime. This has never 
been the sole reason to start planting trees (which are less water intensive). But, it has nevertheless 
been a strong push-factor since as "the water resources have decreased so we don't have sufficient 
water to do agriculture". For others it had just made the agriculture "not going so well” and reduced 
their income. The reduction in rainfall had made farmers dependent on pumping groundwater through 
bore wells but "there is scarcity of electricity here so I couldn't get a proper water supply". In 
combination with increased labor costs the effects on agriculture was severe. Although the main factor 
was higher wages "the second factor is rain, not getting enough water. He's doing hard work in 
agriculture but he's not getting any income."  
 
TIST-assistance in watering 
It was not customary for TIST to offer help with the water situation, but in one case they were found to 
have "promised to give water”. The farmer had experienced big reductions in rainfall over his lifetime 
which impacted his agricultural yields – he had previously abandoned parts of his land that had become 
infertile. With the rest of his land losing profitability tree planting seemed like a promising option but 
“if they didn't say about free water they would not have accepted the free plants” and joined the 
program.  
 
5.3 Altruistic reasons 
 
Besides the above mentioned reasons for planting another reason was mentioned which is not explained 
by the models in part 2. Farmers claimed to have planted solely for the altruistic reason to provide 
environmental benefits for the local and global community. They either planted on their own initiative 
or on the encouragement from TIST.  
 
5.3.1 Personal Initiative  
 
The awareness of the positive environmental impact of planting trees was big and it was expected to 
clean the air, increase rainfall and reduce disease. It was mentioned as a contributing reason to plant 
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trees secondary to earning an income. But it also occurred that their positive effects on the ecosystem 
was enough to inspire establishing a tree plantation altogether. "We are a developing country [...] but 
we are not developing nature, we are demolishing it" was one perspective that led to the intention to be 
"a person to protect the nature". The wish to preserve nature was motivated by the wish that future 
generations can experience it: "I have seen the nature, I want my grandson and granddaughter to see the 
same thing.” The trust in the government to protect the environment was low as "they took no interest 
in that" which spurred the initiative to alone "save the environment".  
5.3.2 Encouraged Altruism 
 
Some peculiar examples exist of how TIST had an influence over the farmers' adoption of the tree 
planting practice. The farmers perceive themselves as being altruistic and that "it is our duty to control 
the pollution, so that other people are not affected". Still they had not planted trees before TIST 
contacted them, either because they were not aware of the benefits of tree planting or they had simply 
not considered the option. When not knowing about the environmental use they still "knew previously 
that we can get [financial] benefits from the trees, but we didn't start until the TIST informed us [of the 
environmental benefits]". In the case when they knew of the environmental benefits, but had just not 
initiated a plantation, the influence from TIST was more subtle. Even though they had some knowledge 
that the "pollution was high there" and that planting trees could help they still didn't plant until the 
TIST staff ”told him of the importance of the environmental goods". In these cases the only new 
information TIST brought was thus the benefits for the environment for planting trees, which were 
perceived as being the main reason for joining.  
 
5.4 With and without TIST 
 
The farmers who stated that they would not have gone through with their plantation without the help 
from TIST consist of nine farmers. Out of these, seven were dependent on the physical and financial 
assistance, such as seedlings, carbon payments and help with providing water, from TIST and two were 
instead influenced by the environmental benefits of the trees. The farmers that would plant without the 
help from TIST make up ten people.  
 
The sample is too small and the selection non-random rendering any proper statistical analysis 
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impossible. Still, some general observations can be made when comparing the two groups providing a 
weak indication at best.   
 
The seven farmers in need of physical and financial assistance had on average half the annual income 
at time of planting compared to the rest of the sample. They also report being constrained on capital to 
a larger extent when it comes to the initial investment cost. This is expected as they were not able to 
afford seedlings in the market. In terms of land the group planting without TIST have more arable land, 
on average 7,6 acres compared to 6 for those in need of TIST.  
 
The group in need of TIST assistance all had an alternative income, either from productive agricultural 
lands or from off-farm sources. The other group on the other hand only had other sources of income in 
4 cases, the rest being fully dependent on making a living of planting trees. Their ability to support 
themselves from agriculture had diminished for already mentioned reasons and with land being their 
only source of income it provided them with a higher incentive to invest in tree plantations. 
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6. Discussion & Conclusions 
 
In this section the effects of the external factors and the TIST-benefits will we discussed and connected 
to the theoretical models and the literature review. 
6.1 External Influence 
 
6.1.1 Labor 
 
The literature suggests that increased wages will encourage tree planting (Enters, 2004; Arnold, 1990), 
which is in line with the economic model of Shively (1998). This explains well the results in this report 
as rising labor costs seem to have spurred farmers to plant trees, meaning the opportunity cost of 
planting trees decreased. The increase in wages was partly attributed to the introduction of the N.R.E.G. 
A. program. It is a public work program that guarantees 100 days of public unskilled work for the rural, 
poor population with the purpose to relieve poverty. It is a country wide program and was first started 
in 2005 and as of 2009 provided a minimum wage of 120 rupees per day. (Zimmerman, 2012) A study 
by Berg (2012) show that in the average district the real agricultural wages increased by 5.3 % within 6 
to 11 months after the program was introduced. Nominal wages are reported to have increased even 
more as the program was being implemented and so the wage increase as perceived by the farmers was 
likely higher than the increase in real wages. The intensity of how the program was introduced varied 
among districts and has led to high variability in the effect of the program among districts. For example 
in Tamil Nadu the agricultural wages increased more than that of the off-farm labor. (NCAER, 2009) 
Considering these facts it can be assumed that at least some of the experienced rises in wages were due 
to N.R.E.G. A. and is a contextual factor contributing to farmers moving away from agriculture to tree 
plantations.  
 
The study revealed that the reduced availability of labor could be the main reason farmers chose trees 
over food crops. Under the N.R.E.G.A. program these effects have been witnessed and landowners 
have been known to “request program to be banned during peak agricultural season" (NCAER, 2009). 
There are reports of farmers leaving their land uncultivated due to lack of labor when workers prefer 
working under N.R.E.G.A. as it is seen as more dignified (NCAER, 2009). The situation reported by 
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the farmers participating in the TIST program appear similar to other findings which find a connection 
between lack of labor and a willingness to plant trees. Although most of these studies focus on 
available household labor and not hired labor the constraints it imposes should be fairly similar 
(Thacher, 1997; Dewees, 1991; Arnold, 1990, Dewees and Saxena, 1995 in Arnold and Dewees 1999). 
Yam Malla (1999) observes similar effects in Nepal when work opportunities in the urban centers drain 
the countryside of laborers and as a response more farmers grow trees.  Arnold & Falconer (1989) 
reported over two decades ago that farmers in India chose to plant trees due to increasing labor costs 
and less available labor. The N.R.E.G.A. must be seen in a broader picture in a society with a rapid 
urbanization and industrialization.  
 
Interviews with forest office officials point out that the N.R.E.G.A has shifted the power balance 
between farmers and farm workers. Previously the farmers had been able to exploit the workers as no 
alternative source of income existed. Since the program started, the workers are able to demand higher 
wages and better working conditions. In the meetings with the TIST-farmers some frustration was 
apparent over this new situation and they complained about the outrageous demands to get proper 
lunches and compensation for transportation. Even anxiety for future rice prices was expressed as the 
number of growers was said to be in decline. In sum, both the model of Shively (1998) and earlier 
research on the connection between labor availability and tree planting provide a plausible explanation 
for the expressed view of the TIST farmers that lack of accessible labor and increased wages have 
forced them to plant trees. As for the effects of N.R.E.G.A more research is needed on how the public-
work programs influence land-use-decisions on fertile lands.  
 
6.1.2 Water 
 
Less precipitation was a contributing reason for the reduction in agricultural income. Although there 
are only few references in the literature that makes the connection between reduced rainfall and 
increased tree planting it follows well from Shively (1998) that circumstances lowering the opportunity 
cost of tree planting will make it more attractive. The actual precipitation data between 2000-2012 
show no actual reduction in rainfall for Tamil Nadu as a whole (Department of economics and 
statistics, 2013). The data are however very coarse and does not display regional variation. Looking at 
the regional rainfall data some reductions can be discerned although the data only shows rainfall for the 
past five years (India Meteorological Department, 2012). In an interview with the Chief Director of the 
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forest department and an assistant in a government reforestation program (similar to that of TIST) the 
farmers' perception of a reduction in rainfall was confirmed. According to them the rainfall had 
diminished, increasing the need to use bore wells in agriculture, which in turn had lowered the ground 
water table. They also see this as a main reason for the success of their own reforestation program, 
where farmers also experience lessened crop yields. Although a reduction in rainfall cannot be 
determined due to lack of data, the distribution of the rainfall might still have changed, becoming less 
in sync with the growing seasons. The farmers' experiences still point to a relationship between access 
to water and the propensity to grow trees, which is observed by Arnold & Falconer (1989). And, if 
farmers choose to plant more trees when precipitation lessen and change, as the results indicate, 
planting trees might be a way to adapt to climate change. As it provides an alternative source of income 
when agricultural yields fail tree-planting programs can work to mitigate the effects of a warmer 
climate with changing rainfall patterns.  
 
6.2 TIST benefits 
 
6.2.1 Education and group meetings 
 
The incentives that failed to attract farmers to any larger extent were the promise of technical assistance 
and expected benefits from group meetings. They were still found to have some attractive power 
although not enough for the farmers to feel it was a necessary prerequisite for joining. Why the 
promised information from TIST on how to establish the plantation was not effective might be because 
the farmers were already familiar with tree planting. All farmers either had some previous experience in 
planting trees or knew someone who did. This likely made them more comfortable in adopting it 
themselves and perceived the risk as lower as predicted by Amacher (1993) and Pattanayak (2002). 
Often the information about the groups were poorly communicated and the original purpose of a forum 
to exchange knowledge and learning together was often lost in exchange for a convenient way to 
transfer the carbon payments. The main purpose of the group is also less concrete, compared to for 
example seedlings, and it might be hard to see how it can actually benefit the plantation. It is also 
difficult to have any clear expectation about a way of working that might be new to the farmer.  All in 
all, the education and working groups were not effective in convincing the farmers to plant trees.  
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Amacher et. al. (1993) predict that an increase in education will ultimately increase the propensity to 
plant trees. But this might not be fully applicable to the attractiveness of TIST's promise of education 
and technical assistance as it will only provide an expectation of more knowledge, but no actual 
increase in knowledge. It would have been interesting to compare the current working method to one 
where the farmers are given an introductory course and then offered to join the program. 
 
6.2.2 Help with watering 
 
Even though trees require less water than food crops, help with watering was still found to be an 
important reason for planting trees. This is likely a consequence of past experience with the detrimental 
effects of reduced rainfall with diminishing yields and land becoming unable to support agriculture. 
When then help with watering was offered it was seen as a great help and of course might have helped 
to keep the seedlings alive in their first, fragile years.  
 
6.2.3 Seedlings & Carbon payments 
 
A reduction in investment costs are expected to have a positive effect on the willingness to plant trees 
according to model 1 (Shively, 1998). The empirical evidence on the effect of providing seedlings and 
cash payments in section 3 all point to these incentives being of secondary importance compared to 
secure tenure, price, access to markets and infrastructure. As neither of these factors has been studied, 
no claims can be made regarding them. But, the general notion that seedlings and payments are most 
effective when the general incentives to plant trees already exist is applicable to this case. Drawing on 
the findings of Nibbering (1999) that a reduction in agricultural returns made way for free seedlings 
and monetary payments to have an impact, we can see clear similarities in our case. Instead of 
degradation of land it is increased labor costs and reduced rainfall that cause the returns in agriculture 
to decrease. Building on this previous knowledge it is likely that these incentives from TIST had an 
effect since the economic context already provided good reasons to abandon agriculture for silviculture. 
As intuition might predict, the reason for the effectiveness of the seedlings and payments was that 
farmers were limited in their ability to afford seedlings and the maintenance costs. Lamb (2011) makes 
the same observation and concludes that the effectiveness of free seedlings depend on the farmer's 
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ability to afford them at market price. So in this setting, with farmers facing problems in agriculture, 
TIST has a good chance to encourage farmers and even more so if they are able to target the more 
capital constrained groups. 
6.2.4 Altruism 
 
TIST was able to convince farmers to plant trees by informing them about the environmental benefits 
of tree planting such as reducing pollution and getting more rainfall. It should be kept in mind that this 
has an effect and should be mentioned when introducing the program to new farmers. 
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